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Chapter 4 
France 
Robert Elgie 
The Constitution of the Fifth French Republic was adopted by referendum 
in September 1958. Article 6 of the Constitution stated that the President 
of the Republic would be elected by an electoral college comprising nearly 
80,000 people, consisting mainly of parliamentarians and representatives 
of local government. Meanwhile, Article 20 stated that the prime minister 
was accountable to the National Assembly and Articles 49 and 50 made it 
clear that if the prime minister was defeated in a vote of confidence then 
there was no option but to resign. By virtue of these characteristics, then, 
the original text of the 1958 Constitution unequivocally established a 
parliamentary regime. However, in October 1962 the Constitution was 
amended by way of another referendum. Article 6 was changed to allow 
for the direct election of the president by universal suffrage. At this point, 
therefore, the Fifth Republic was transformed into a semi-presidential 
regime. 
As one writer has nicely put it, if the 1962 constitutional amendment 
granted the president no new powers, then “it did afford him an 
important new power” (Wright, 1989, p. 13), namely popular legitimacy. 
Prior to the 1962 reform the president was a major political actor. For the 
most part this was due to the personal characteristics of the first 
incumbent of the office, Charles de Gaulle. After the 1962 reform, though, 
the presidency was a major political actor. The president’s capacity to 
influence the system was institutionalised. Presidential elections became 
the focal point of the regime. The president’s campaign promises became 
the manifesto which the government was mandated to implement. And 
yet, since this time the extent of presidential power has still varied. The 
nature of the French semi-presidential system is such that the president 
cannot exercise power without the help of the prime minister. As a 
general rule, in the early years of the system prime ministers were willing 
subjects and presidents reigned supreme. Increasingly, though, presidents 
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have been obliged to appoint political enemies as prime minister and 
presidential rule has been openly challenged. 
In this chapter, the relationship between the president and the prime 
minister in the Fifth Republic will be explored. In the first section, an 
overview of presidential/prime ministerial relations will be provided. In 
the second section, the constitutional situation, the founding context of the 
1962 reform and the relationship between the president and the 
parliamentary majority will be discussed. In the conclusion, the wider 
context of presidential/prime ministerial relations will be considered and 
the changing parameters of executive leadership generally will be 
discussed. In these ways, the contemporary nature of the Fifth Republic’s 
semi-presidential system will be established. 
Patterns of political leadership 
The Fifth Republic is characterised by a twin-headed executive, or 
executive dyarchy, in the sense that the president and prime minister are 
both important figures in their own right. However, the Fifth Republic can 
best be classed as a hierarchical dyarchy (Massot, 1993) in that on 
occasions leadership responsibilities have been incumbent upon the 
president and at other times they have rested with the prime minister. 
Broadly speaking, the presidency was strongest during the early years of 
the regime, whereas prime ministerial government has occurred at regular 
intervals since the mid-1980s. 
The president is a powerful political actor. This is particularly true in the 
domain of ‘high’ politics. The president is France’s most prominent 
international spokesperson, leading the French delegation at summit 
meetings, maintaining close bilateral contacts with the world’s most 
powerful leaders and receiving transcripts of reports from French 
embassies overseas. Successive presidents have maintained control over 
defence policy issues, arising out of the president’s responsibility for 
France’s nuclear deterrent. They have also been active in foreign affairs, 
consistently asserting France’s independence from the two superpowers 
in the 1960s and 1970s and then promoting the country’s interests in the 
post-communist system. They have also shaped both France’s policy 
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towards the European Communities/Union and the policies of the 
institutions at the European level as well. Overall, this influence in the 
realm of ‘high’ politics has led successive presidents to speak and appear 
as if they incarnated France itself. Consequently, the presidential verb is 
always a grandiloquent one and the presidential portrait has a regal 
aspect. (For a list of president and prime ministers since 1958, see Figure 
4.1). 
Figure 4.1 
Presidents and prime ministers in France, 1958-98 
President Prime minister 
Charles de Gaulle (1959-69) 
 
 
Georges Pompidou (1969-74) 
 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1974-81) 
 
François Mitterrand (1981-95) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jacques Chirac (1995- ) 
Michel Debré (1959-62) 
Georges Pompidou (1962-68) 
Maurice Couve de Murville (68-69) 
Jacques Chaban-Delmas (1969-72) 
Pierre Messmer (1972-74) 
Jacques Chirac (1974-76) 
Raymond Barre (1976-81) 
Pierre Mauroy (1981-84) 
Laurent Fabius (1984-86) 
Jacques Chirac (1986-88) 
Michel Rocard (1988-91) 
Edith Cresson (1991-92) 
Pierre Bérégovoy (1992-93) 
Edouard Balladur (1993-95) 
Alain Juppé (1995-97) 
Lionel Jospin (1997- ) 
 
If presidents have been careful to cultivate their role in ‘high’ politics, 
they are also obliged to delve into the domain of ‘low’ politics too. The 
rationale for this is straightforward. Presidential elections are won and 
lost on ‘bread and butter’ issues: the economy, social policy, cultural 
matters and so on. Presidential candidates fight elections on the basis of a 
platform which addresses these issues. Consequently, once elected, 
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presidents have a quasi-contractual responsibility to ensure that their 
election promises are kept. They also have an electoral incentive to do so 
because their chances of re-election are affected by the perception of their 
performance in this respect. Presidents, then, have to show an interest in 
basic policy matters. At the same time, though, they tend to intervene only 
obliquely in this domain. Rarely, if ever, have they taken personal and 
charge of domestic policy making. More frequently, they have preferred 
to encourage or chide the government by way of a carefully chosen phrase 
in a interview or a visit to a symbolically important location. The result is 
that the media army of Elysée-watchers is constantly on the look-out for 
presidential titbits, deciphering the president’s words and decoding the 
president’s image. 
At the same time the prime minister is also a powerful political actor. In 
contrast to the president, whose administrative support structures are 
light, the prime minister is at the head of an extensive set of governmental, 
administrative and information services. The policy-making process 
cannot function without these services. Consequently, the prime minister 
occupies the most strategically important position within the system when 
it comes to the nitty-gritty business of policy preparation and 
implementation. The result of this position is that the prime minister is 
inextricably linked with the day-to-day conduct of the government’s 
business. Outside ‘cohabitation’ (see below) the president will have a 
considerable personal interest in whether or not the government’s policy 
decisions are successful but it is the prime minister whose political future 
is most immediately associated with the administration’s short-term 
policy performance. 
The prime minister is also closely associated with the work of 
parliament and with the conduct of legislative elections. The president 
takes no part in the parliamentary process. The prime minister, though, 
has both to defend the government’s record there and to ensure a majority 
for the government’s policies. Once again, this means that the prime 
minister is associated with the everyday business of government. The 
prime minister becomes the most public representative of the 
government’s policies. In addition, the prime minister usually leads the 
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government’s troops in the general election campaign. The president will 
sometimes decide the timing of the election and may appear on television 
and urge people to vote for his supporters. It is the prime minister, 
though, who criss-crosses the country’s constituencies in the search for 
votes. It is also the prime minister who is most closely in contact with the 
party organisations which support the government. Again, the president 
may sometimes arrange the set, but the prime minister is the one who is 
on stage for the performance. 
In this way, then, the Fifth Republic is an amalgamation of both 
presidential and prime ministerial responsibilities. In this sense, there is a 
twin-headed executive. As one prominent writer has noted: “Governing, 
at the end of the day, is the process of drawing up and implementing 
policy. These two aspects are inseparable. If this definition is accepted, it 
must be admitted that the President of the Republic and the Prime 
Minister govern France together” (de Baecque, 1976, p. 165). The same 
writer has also stated that “it is by the common action of the head of state 
and the head of government that the executive discharges its 
responsibilities” (de Baecque, 1986, p. 283). Another prominent writer has 
argued that “there is an extraordinary complexity in the relations between 
the head of state and the head of government. If the normal situation is 
indeed that there is a certain hierarchy which guarantees presidential pre-
eminence, it is also the case that … the President cannot do without a 
Prime Minister … [T]he sharing of roles, in other words a dyarchy, is also 
a necessity” (Massot, 1993, p. 174). As this last quotation suggests, though, 
even if the essence of the French semi-presidentialism system is an 
executive dyarchy, it is a hierarchical dyarchy in which power is usually 
skewed more in favour of one political actor than another. 
For the most part, the political balance has been on the side of the 
presidency. In this respect, the most powerful presidents are generally to 
be found in the early years of the Fifth Republic. The first president, 
Charles de Gaulle, was a particularly dominant figure. He benefited from 
an unrivalled personal authority derived from his wartime record and 
subsequent opposition to the unloved Fourth Republic (1946-58). In the 
first years of the Fifth Republic he confined himself largely to foreign and 
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defence policy making and to the resolution of the Algerian war with the 
prime minister assuming responsibility for domestic affairs. After the 
granting of Algerian independence, though, de Gaulle increasingly 
intervened in this area too. De Gaulle’s successor, Georges Pompidou, was 
also a strong political figure. Although he lacked de Gaulle’s political 
stature, he was equally keen to ensure that he left a personal imprint on 
the policy-making process. Indeed, for at least one writer, the Fifth 
Republic under Pompidou was even more presidentialised than under de 
Gaulle (Décaumont, 1979). In addition to the early years of the Fifth 
Republic, the first period of François Mitterrand’s presidency from 1981-
86 provides the other main example of a powerful president. The 
president swept the left into power for the first time in the history of the 
Fifth Republic and the government embarked on an ambitious 
programme of policy reforms which the president oversaw. The two 
prime ministers during this period were both intimately involved in the 
policy-making process, but ultimately were still subordinate (Elgie, 1993). 
Since the first two presidents of the Fifth Republic (and with the 
exception of the early Mitterrand years) the presidency has been less 
powerful but has still been the most prominent figure in the political 
system. For example, in 1974 the election of the first non-gaullist 
president, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, marked a departure from the then 
norm of the Fifth Republic. For some, Giscard’s presidency confirmed the 
presidentialisation of the system. As one writer noted: “[t]he French are 
scarcely aware of the fact, but their President is, by a long way, the most 
powerful chief executive in the West …” (Duhamel, Alain, 1980, p. 23). In 
fact, though, Giscard’s hold on power was weaker than his two 
predecessors. He fought a phoney war with his first prime minister, 
Jacques Chirac, before the latter resigned in protest. He then allowed his 
second prime minister, Raymond Barre, whom Giscard introduced to the 
public as “the best economist in France”,  to manage, poorly as it turned 
out, the country’s economic and social affairs while the president confined 
himself mainly to foreign, defence and European policy. A similar pattern 
characterised the first period of the second Mitterrand presidency (1988-
93). In 1988 Mitterrand was easily re-elected but was then immediately 
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obliged to appoint one of his long-term rivals, Michel Rocard, as prime 
minister. Mitterrand and Rocard were uneasy bedfellows and the 
president hastened the prime minister out of office in 1991. In his place, 
Mitterrand appointed Edith Cresson who proceeded to break all records 
for prime ministerial unpopularity. By the time Cresson had been replaced 
by Pierre Bérégovoy the president had long since become preoccupied 
with the development of the European Union to the exclusion of most 
other issues. 
The first period of Jacques Chirac’s presidency also fits into this 
category (1995-97). The return of a gaullist to the Elysée Palace did not see 
a return to the presidential hegemony of the de Gaulle and Pompidou 
years. The gaullist party was no longer monolithic and the president was 
faced with a much more fragmented set of power structures than was 
previously the case (Elgie and Wright, 1996). And yet, with the support of 
a loyal prime minister, the people still expected the president to keep his 
electoral promises and solve the country’s problems. Chirac responded 
but not in a way that the public appreciated. For example, in October 1995 
he bowed to various pressures and personally announced that France was 
unequivocally committed to the Maastricht criteria. This, though, seemed 
to be a reversal of his election position and satisfied neither his own 
supporters nor those who opposed him. In this way, the early part of 
Chirac’s presidency indicates that the president was still the ultimate 
reference point but the independent decision-making capacity of the office 
was more limited than before (see the conclusion to this chapter). When 
the president tried to reassert both his and the government’s authority by 
dissolving the National Assembly in March 1997, the result was an 
unexpected but devastating defeat for the president’s supporters. 
It general, then, the Fifth Republic’s dyarchy has operated to the 
advantage of the president. On three recent occasions, though, (1986-88, 
1993-95 and 1997- ) this has not been the case and a period of political 
‘cohabitation’ has occurred. ‘Cohabitation’ is the situation where a 
president from one political party holds office at the same time as a prime 
minister from an opposing political party. During ‘cohabitation’ the 
balance of power tilts towards the prime minister. This is because 
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presidential control is at least partly based on the support of a loyal 
parliamentary majority. It is the presence of such a majority which has 
allowed successive presidents to appoint the prime minister of their 
choice. However, when the majority opposes the president, then the 
president no longer enjoys such a luxury. In this situation, it is the prime 
minister who, with the backing of the parliamentary majority, assumes 
responsibility not just for policy co-ordination and implementation, as 
usual, but for policy initiation as well. 
During ‘cohabitation’ there is in general terms a relatively clear division 
of responsibility between the president and the prime minister. In the 
domain of domestic policy it is the prime minister who takes the lead. It is 
the prime minister’s programme which serves as the government’s plan of 
action and the prime minister decides which elements of that programme 
will be legislated. By contrast, the president’s role is minimal. The 
president can criticise the government’s plans and has certain powers to 
delay the passage of legislation. However, the president loses any de facto 
power to veto legislation or even to influence it in any way. By contrast, in 
the domain of foreign, defence and European policy the president does 
maintain a certain degree of control. Prime ministers usually try to shape 
strategic policy decisions by making international speeches or proposing 
plans for reform. Nevertheless, the president is still treated as the main 
spokesperson for French interests abroad and reserves the right to oversee 
the overall direction of policy in this domain. 
Within this general context, the particular relationship between the 
president and prime minister has varied somewhat from one period of 
‘cohabitation’ to another. During the first period (1986-88), prime minister 
Chirac was responsible for taking all key domestic policy decisions. For 
example, he personally decided which of the state controlled television 
channels should be privatised and he was responsible for the most 
difficult arbitrations in the budgetary policy-making process (Elgie, 1993). 
At the same time, though, president Mitterrand was a constant thorn in 
his side. Mitterrand established himself as a clear opponent of the prime 
minister’s domestic programme even if he was unable to alter the content 
of the government’s policies. By contrast, in the realm of foreign and 
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defence policy making the president maintained an influence, insisting, 
for example, that France’s short-range nuclear arms were not ‘tactical’, 
battlefield weapons, but were part of a wider, ‘strategic’ whole (Howorth, 
1993, p. 158). During the second period  (1993-95), prime minister Balladur 
was as influential as Chirac had been previously, determining France’s 
position during the GATT world trade negotiations and deciding the 
manner in which the July 1993 constitutional amendment, limiting the 
right of political asylum, was adopted. On this occasion, though, 
Mitterrand’s position was weaker than before. The right’s victory in 1993 
was much greater than in 1986 and the president’s room for manoeuvre 
was reduced accordingly. He was also weakened by age (he was 76 in 
1993) and illness. Consequently, even in foreign and defence policy-
making, the president was less influential than before. For example, 
Balladur assumed responsibility for sending French troops to manage the 
security and humanitarian problem in Rwanda. During the third period 
(1997- ), prime minister Jospin’s influence has been as great as might by 
now be expected but president Chirac has had considerable difficulty in 
carving out a coherent role for himself. Even though Jospin heads a multi-
party coalition, his party, the Socialist party, is the dominant force and so 
the prime minister is in a position to shape the policy process perhaps to 
an even greater extent than ‘cohabitation’ prime ministers previously. By 
contrast, Chirac is a spent force. He is now only a point of ‘reference’ for 
his own gaullist party supporters and he is blamed for the electoral defeat 
by the right as a whole. As usual, he has distanced himself from the 
government’s domestic policy and has tried to maintain an influence in 
foreign, defence and European policy. These efforts, though, do not hide 
the fact that he is a lameduck president who wields scarcely more power 
than the aged and infirmed president Mitterrand at the end of his term of 
office. 
Evidence suggests, therefore, that the Fifth Republic’s executive dyarchy 
has not been characterised by a single mode of political leadership. Even 
though overall there has been a propensity towards presidential 
government, the pattern of political responsibilities has always been a 
function of the particularities of presidential/prime ministerial 
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relationship that have occurred at any one time. Moreover, evidence 
suggests that in recent years the general tendency towards presidential 
government has itself been weakened and that the opportunity for prime 
ministerial government has become more marked. In the next section, the 
factors which help both to establish these basic tendencies and to create 
the particularities of the relationship will be considered. 
French semi-presidentialism in context 
Constitutional powers 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, to the extent that the 1962 
reform conferred no new powers on the president, then it is still the basic 
text of the 1958 constitution which sets out the respective positions of the 
president and prime minister. The essence of this text is twofold. Firstly, it 
establishes the conditions for a strong executive. Secondly, within the 
executive it provides both the president and the prime minister with a set 
of constitutionally defined powers. 
The Fifth Republic was deliberately designed to be the antithesis of its 
immediate predecessor, the Fourth Republic. By common consent, the 
Fourth Republic suffered from chronic governmental instability. There 
were 25 governments in the 12 year history of the regime. As a result, one 
of the main motivations of all of the founding parents of the Fifth Republic 
was the desire to create the conditions for executive stability. For example, 
when presenting the new constitution to the Council of State in August 
1958, Michel Debré noted that “the purpose of this constitution … is, first 
and foremost, to try to reconstruct the governmental authority without 
which there is neither State nor democracy, that is, as far as we are 
concerned, neither France nor Republic”. To this end, the powers of 
parliament were weakened, leading one observer to note that “[u]nder the 
new régime the Parliament of France, once among the most powerful in 
the world, became one of the weakest” (Williams, 1968, p. 21), and the 
powers of the executive were strengthened. The 1958 constitution, then, 
establishes a framework for executive dominance over parliament.  
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Within the executive, the 1958 constitution provides both the resources 
for presidential influence and the basis for prime ministerial government. 
The president has a number of specific constitutional powers. For 
example, the president names the prime minister (Article 8) and appoints 
a certain number of civil and military figures (Article 13) as well as three 
members of the Constitutional Council including its president (Article 56). 
The president can dissolve the National Assembly, although not more 
than once a year (Article 12); can oblige parliament to reconsider a bill, 
although only within 15 days of the bill being passed (Article 10); can 
submit a bill to the Constitutional Council for consideration (Article 61); 
can assume all law-making powers in the case of a national emergency 
(Article 16); and is charged with the responsibility for negotiating and 
ratifying treaties (Article 52). In addition, the president also has one very 
general prerogative. Article 5 states that the president is charged with 
seeing that the constitution is respected, with ensuring, by his arbitration, 
the regular functioning of public authorities and the continuity of the state 
and with guaranteeing national independence, territorial integrity and the 
respect for international treaties. As one writer notes, this article 
“constitutionalises the spirit of the presidential function” (Ardant, 1987, p. 
38) but it does at the expense of “contributing to the blurring of the 
president’s place in the institutional structures” (ibid). In other words, 
Article 5 encourages the perception that the president is above the 
political process but at the same time it can also legitimise almost any 
intervention that the president might wish to make. 
The prime minister also has a set of constitutional powers. In this 
respect, three articles are particularly important. Article 20 states that the 
government decides and directs the policy of the nation, that it has the 
administration and the armed forces at its disposal and that it is 
accountable to the lower house of the legislature, the National Assembly; 
Article 21 states that the prime minister is in general charge of the 
government’s work and the implementation of laws; and Article 8 states 
that the prime minister has the right to propose the names of government 
ministers to the president for approval. So, the prime minister is placed at 
the head of a government, the members of which he or she has chosen and 
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which is collectively responsible for the day-to-day realisation and 
implementation of public policy. In addition to these articles, the prime 
minister has a further set of powers in relation to parliament by virtue of 
being head of government. The prime minister has the right to issue 
decrees in the areas in which parliament is not permitted to legislate 
(Articles 21 and 37); to request an extraordinary session of parliament 
(Article 29), to initiate legislation (Article 39); to accelerate the legislative 
process (Article 38); and to call for a vote of confidence in the government 
(Article 49). Lastly, the prime minister can also submit a bill to the 
Constitutional Council (Article 61) and can make various civilian and 
military appointments (Article 21). 
In addition to the individual powers of the president and prime 
minister, there are also certain powers which are quite explicitly shared 
between the two institutions. For example, with a few notable exceptions, 
such as the right to dissolve the National Assembly, the prime minister 
must countersign all presidential decisions (Article 19), which in theory at 
least gives the prime minister the right to veto all but a few presidential 
actions and which can be particularly important during periods of 
‘cohabitation’. By contrast, though, the president has to sign all decrees 
that are considered in the Council of Ministers (Article 13), which 
somewhat restricts the role of the prime minister and which, again, is 
potentially most significant during periods of presidential/prime 
ministerial conflict. Similarly, Article 21 states that the prime minister is 
responsible for national defence but Article 15 declares that the president 
is the head of the armed forces. Equally, even though the prime minister is 
at the head of a government which decides and directs the policy of the 
nation, it is the president who chairs the Council of Ministers, the French 
equivalent of the cabinet (Article 9). Finally, the president can call a 
referendum on any bill but only on the proposition of the government 
collectively (Article 11) or the prime minister personally (Article 89). 
It is apparent, then, that under the 1958 constitution the executive is 
expected to lead and both the president and the prime minister are 
required to perform key leadership functions. The result, though, 
according to one contemporary observer at least, was that “one cannot 
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avoid being struck by the vast amount of ambiguity” which is contained 
in the constitution (Hoffman, 1959, p. 332). Similarly, according to another 
observer, the distribution of executive power means that: “[t]he central 
question of any constitution — who rules? — is fudged” (Wright, 1989, p. 
12). In other words, it is the 1958 constitution which is primarily 
responsible for creating the finely balanced constitutional dyarchy. In 
general terms, the prime minister is charged with guiding and co-
ordinating all matters which concern the immediate governance of the 
country, whereas the president is given the task of overseeing and 
protecting the long-term interests of the regime. This general division of 
labour neatly corresponds to the basic pattern of presidential 
responsibility for ‘high’ politics and prime ministerial control over 
domestic decisions. And yet, this general division of labour represents 
only half the picture. The overlap between presidential and prime 
ministerial powers is so great that there is ample scope for either 
institution to control the policy making process when the necessary 
conditions are in place and for both institutions to fight for control when 
they are not. 
The founding context 
The text of the 1958 constitution sets the scene for the Fifth Republic’s 
executive dyarchy. At the same time, though, the founding context of the 
1962 reform helps to account for the presidentialised nature of the 
decision-making process for much of the Fifth Republic. In this respect, 
there are two important elements to the founding context: the experience 
of presidential decision making in the period immediately prior to the 
1962 reform and the events surrounding the passage of the reform itself. 
Firstly, the circumstances leading up to the 1962 reform were significant. 
Even though the 1958 constitution established a balanced executive 
dyarchy, in practice political power was soon presidentialised. In 
September 1958 when the General first outlined the constitution he stated 
that the president would be a “national arbiter, far removed from political 
bickering”. In the same speech, though, he also stated that the constitution 
would allow the country to be “effectively governed by those to whom it 
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gives the mandate and to whom it grants confidence …”. De Gaulle 
believed that the people had given him a mandate by agreeing to the 1958 
constitution in the September referendum and that this mandate had been 
confirmed as a result of both his election by what he considered to be a 
wide-ranging electoral college in December 1958 and then subsequent 
referendums which were held in January 1961 and April 1962 on Algerian 
self-determination. For these reasons, de Gaulle felt free to interpret his 
role quite liberally. The result was that by the time of the 1962 
constitutional reform, the president was already the country’s dominant 
political reference point not the prime minister. In this way, the precedent 
of presidential government had been set even before the reform was 
passed and the practice of presidential pre-eminence was simply 
institutionalised by way of the constitutional amendment. 
Secondly, the precise circumstances surrounding the 1962 reform were 
also significant. Events unfolded as follows. On 22 August 1962 there was 
an assassination attempt on de Gaulle’s life. On 12 September de Gaulle 
announced that a referendum would be organised on the direct election of 
the president. On 20 September it was announced that Article 11 of the 
constitution would be used to hold the referendum. On 26 September a 
government minister resigned in opposition to the reform. On 1 October 
the Council of State advised the government that the referendum was 
unconstitutional. On 6 October the government was defeated in the 
National Assembly and the prime minister tendered his resignation. On 7 
October de Gaulle announced that parliament would be dissolved and 
that there would be a legislative election. On 28 October the referendum 
was approved by 61.8 per cent of those voting. On 18 and 25 November 
the parties of the governing coalition made big gains in the legislative 
election such that the government enjoyed an overall parliamentary 
majority. The significance of these events lies in the fact that they ensured 
that the debate surrounding divisive constitutional issues was 
overshadowed by the debate concerning the very future of the regime and 
the president’s place within it. 
In the period from August to October there were two main 
constitutional issues. The first concerned the reform itself. In 1848 the 
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Second Republic introduced the direct election of the president. However, 
the first directly elected president, Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, then 
engineered a coup d’état in 1851, so discrediting the concept for many years 
thereafter and leading to indirectly elected presidents in the Third and 
Fourth Republics. Indeed, as late as 1958 there was still no question of 
installing either a presidential or semi-presidential regime during the 
constitutional deliberations and in September 1962 the left was opposed to 
de Gaulle’s reform as were many elements of the centre-right. Indeed, a 
wide-ranging ‘cartel des non’ was formed to campaign for a ‘no’ vote at 
the referendum. Against this background, it may be the case that de 
Gaulle had previously avoided proposing such a reform for tactical 
reasons (Rudelle, 1984, p. 689) and it is certainly the case both that the 
granting of Algerian independence in early 1962 raised one obstacle to the 
reform (voters in Algeria would otherwise have been eligible to vote) and 
that France’s acquisition of a nuclear capacity in 1961 meant that the 
president’s responsibilities were now of a completely different nature than 
before. Nevertheless, it is quite apparent that de Gaulle was in a minority 
when he put forward the amendment and that many people were 
vehemently opposed to it. 
The second constitutional issue concerned de Gaulle’s use of Article 11. 
This article then stated that the president could organise a referendum on 
any issue relating to the ‘public powers’. For most people, including the 
lawyers in the Council of State and the Constitutional Council, the direct 
election of the president was not such an issue. In this way, then, de 
Gaulle was not only proposing a controversial reform he was also 
proposing it in a constitutionally controversial manner. 
These constitutional issues, however, were overshadowed by the effects 
of the governmental, legislative and presidential crises with which the 
system was faced. The governmental crisis was caused, first, by the 
resignation of a senior minister and, second, by the forced resignation of 
the prime minister following the loss of a vote of confidence in the 
National Assembly. (This remains the only time that the government has 
been brought down by the legislature under the Fifth Republic.) Its main 
effect was to remind people of the executive instability of the Fourth 
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Republic which, supposedly, the people had sanctioned by voting so 
overwhelmingly for the new regime in 1958. The legislative crisis was 
caused by de Gaulle’s decision to dissolve parliament rather than simply 
appoint a different prime minister who might have been acceptable to the 
existing National Assembly. In this way, de Gaulle upped the political 
ante and challenged his opponents. The presidential crisis was caused by 
de Gaulle’s indication that he would resign if the referendum was 
defeated. This was a favourite presidential tactic and this time, as before, it 
had the desired effect of personalising the crisis. The net effect of these 
crises was to deflect attention away from the ins-and-outs of the various 
constitutional niceties and to force both politicians and voters alike to 
think not just in terms of whether or not they were in favour of the reform 
per se and the way in which it was being proposed, but whether or not 
they were in favour of the government, the regime and the General 
himself (Lagroye, 1992). 
For both reasons, then, the 1962 reform represented more than simply a 
minor constitutional victory for those who happened to support a 
particular reform. Instead, it also represented the point at which support 
for the political system of the Fifth Republic and its proclivity towards 
presidential politics was crystallised. In this sense, the context of the 1962 
reform should be seen as a fundamental part of the process which 
institutionalised both the Fifth Republic itself and the practice of 
presidential government within it. It did so by reinforcing the popular 
expectation that presidential government was the ‘normal’ way for the 
Fifth Republic to function, by establishing the presidential election as the 
focal point of the political process and by providing de Gaulle’s successors 
with at least the opportunity to assume his political mantle. Only over 
time have the conditions which caused this propensity towards 
presidential government been weakened. 
Presidential/party relations 
At this stage, then, we can assert that there is a basic constitutional balance 
between the president and the prime minister but that the context of the 
1962 reform reinforced the the already established tendency towards 
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presidential pre-eminence. It is apparent, though, that, since this time, 
there have been different modes of presidential/prime ministerial 
relations. In short, presidential pre-eminence is conjunctural. In other 
words, the president’s ability to influence the decison-making process 
varies according to the prevailing political situation. As such, presidential 
power should be treated not as an independent variable but as a 
dependent variable. In this respect, Duverger has argued that the power 
of the president is dependent upon two factors: the nature of the 
parliamentary majority and the relationship between the president and 
that majority (Duverger, 1996a, p. 511). For the most part the president has 
benefited from the conjunction of political forces but increasingly this has 
not been the case. 
As noted in Chapter 1, Duverger states that various elements determine 
the president’s party power (Duverger, 1978, p. 122). Firstly, there is the 
issue of whether there is an absolute majority in the legislature, whether 
there is only a quasi-majority, or whether there is no majority at all. 
Secondly, there is the issue of whether the majority comprises either a 
single-party, a coalition of parties in which one party is dominant, or a 
coalition in which the various parties are equally strong. Thirdly, there is 
the issue of whether the president leads the majority, is opposed to the 
majority, is simply a member of the majority, or is a neutral figure. The 
various combinations of these elements correspond to different degrees of 
presidential power. All other things being equal, when the president is the 
leader of a single-party majority, then the potential for presidential power 
is at its greatest. By contrast, when the president is opposed to a single-
party majority, then the potential for presidential power is at its weakest. 
In between these two extremes, there is a variety of scenarios. In this 
respect, both Duverger (1996a, pp. 519-574) and Keeler and Schain (1996) 
have identified three basic modes of presidential/parliamentary relations. 
By contrast, Olivier Duhamel has proposed seven such modes in the 
period from 1958-93 (1995, p. 125). For the purposes of this exercise a 
similar number of modes will be examined although these vary from the 
ones proposed by Duhamel. (See Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2 
Modes of presidential/parliamentary relations in France, 
1958-98 
   Absolute majority Quasi- 
maj. 
No 
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81-86 
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78-81 
88-93 (58-62) 
The majority opposes the 
president 
 97- 86-88 
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The first set of scenarios occurs when the presidential and parliamentary 
majorities coincide. As noted above, this is the most common scenario 
under which the Fifth Republic has operated and it corresponds to the 
various periods when presidents have been at their strongest or when 
they have at least been the most prominent figures within the executive. In 
the first case, the president has enjoyed the support of an absolute 
majority in the legislature and has either led a one-party government or a 
coalition in which the president’s party has been far stronger than any 
other. This helps to account, then, for the strength of the presidency 
during much of the de Gaulle presidency, the Pompidou presidency and 
the first period of the Mitterrand presidency (1962-74 and 1981-96). In the 
second case, there has been a variety of situations. At times, the president 
has enjoyed the support of an absolute majority in the legislature but has 
led a coalition in which the president’s party was the weaker of the 
coalition partners. This was the situation during the early years of the 
Giscard presidency (1974-78). At other times, the president has enjoyed 
the support of an absolute majority but has led a coalition in which the 
president’s party has been only one of two more or less equal partners. 
This was the situation during the later years of the Giscard presidency 
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(1978-81) and during the first period of the Chirac presidency (1995-97). At 
yet other times still, there has only been a quasi-majority in parliament, 
even though it has supported the president. This was the situation during 
the first period of Mitterrand’s second term in office (1988-93). In these 
ways, then, the nature of the parliamentary majority and the relationship 
between the president and the parliamentary majority helps to account 
not just for the general tendency towards presidential leadership in the 
early years of the Fifth Republic but also more generally for the varying 
degrees of presidential leadership since 1958. 
The second set of scenarios occurs when the presidential and 
parliamentary majorities are opposed to each other. Again, as noted 
above, this has occurred on three occasions during the Fifth Republic. 
Even on these occasions, though, an examination of the precise 
configuration of these two factors helps to differentiate between the 
various experiences of ‘cohabitation’. On the first two occasions during 
the Chirac and Balladur premierships (1986-88 and 1993-95) the prime 
minister enjoyed the support of an absolute majority in the legislature 
(Chirac only just, Balladur overwhelmingly so) but led a coalition in 
which the two coalition partners were of relatively equal strength. During 
these times, the prime minister was strong but was still obliged to 
accommodate the demands of his coalition partner. By contrast, on the 
third occasion during the Jospin premiership (1997- ) the prime minister 
has enjoyed the support of an absolute majority and has led a government 
in which his party was by far the largest component. During this time, the 
prime minister has still been obliged to accommodate the demands of his 
partners in the ‘plural’ coalition, but has also benefited from both the 
strength of the Socialist party and the dispersed forces of the other 
coalition groups. Once again, therefore, the combination of nature of the 
parliamentary majority and the relationship between, this time, the prime 
minister and the parliamentary majority helps to account for the varying 
degrees of prime ministerial leadership during the Fifth Republic. 
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Conclusion — The contemporary nature of French semi-
presidentialism 
There are various approaches to the study of presidential power in the 
Fifth Republic (Elgie, 1996). The framework that Duverger has provided 
represents one such approach. The strength of this approach lies in the 
fact that it demonstrates why the president has consistently been the 
major political actor in the system but also why presidential power is 
fragile. It does so by underscoring the point that the president operates 
within a twin-headed executive system and that the key variable within 
the system is the parliamentary majority and the president’s relationship 
with it. And yet, it is also necessary to place both the presidency and the 
prime ministership in their wider political context. The French semi-
presidential system is built up of a series of overlapping relationships. 
These include the relationship between the president and the prime 
minister and the relationship between the president, prime minister and 
parliamentary majority. They also include, though, other relationships. 
They include the relationship between the executive and wider state 
structures; the relationship between the political elite and the people; and 
the relationship between France, Europe and the world generally. As the 
nature of these relationships changes so too does the power of the 
executive as a whole and within it the respective powers of the president 
and prime minister (Elgie and Wright, 1996). 
In this respect, the recent evolution of these relationships has challenged 
the basic authority of the French executive. For example, France has 
generally become less state-centred. Some elements of the state have been 
privatised. Other aspects of state control have been off-loaded onto 
independent administrative agencies. State planning in general has been 
downgraded and the language of evaluation, consumer charters and new 
public management has become the norm. At the same time, the gap 
between the people and the people’s representatives has widened. Fewer 
people are now willing to trust politicians. More people are likely to vote 
for ‘unconventional’ parties. More people are ready to engage in social 
protests which bypass normal party organisations. Fewer people are 
happy to defer to traditional political authority structures. Equally, 
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France’s relationship with both its European and world partners has 
changed. French governments risk losing control, or at least being seen to 
lose control, of policy-making functions in many fundamental areas. 
Budgetary policy choices have been restricted. Monetary policy choices 
have been curtailed. World trade negotiations threaten broadcasting 
policy. European regulations curb competition and industrial policy. In all 
of these ways, the state in France has become as hollow as the state in 
many other established liberal democracies. As a result, those who are 
responsible for governing have less and less government with which to 
carry out their essential tasks (Rhodes, 1996). 
The changing nature of governance in France affects the place of the 
president and prime minister in the system and the analysis of their 
powers. In the past, French policy was made at least relatively 
independently. Within France the state was strong. Within the state the 
executive wielded the levers of power. Within the executive, then, the 
battle between the president and the prime minister was the main battle 
for political power. In this context, the text of the constitution was 
significant, the precedent of presidential goverment was essential and the 
nature of the parliamentary majority was crucial. Now, though, with the 
decline of independent policy making, the weakening of the state and the 
challenge to the position of the executive, the battle between the president 
and the prime minister looks increasingly peripheral. True, the 
constitution sets out the rules of the political game, the public still expects 
the president and the government to achieve results and the composition 
of the parliamentary majority continues to determine the basic contours of 
presidential and prime ministerial influence. Even so, the position of the 
president and the prime minister within the wider system is undoubtedly 
less influential now than it was previously. 
In this way, then, the changing nature of French governance needs to be 
integrated into an account of the nature of French semi-presidentialism. It 
helps to explain why the earliest presidents of the Fifth Republic were 
generally the strongest. It also helps to explain why recent presidents have 
failed to meet popular expectations and why periods of ‘cohabitation’ 
have become increasingly frequent as the public has become more and 
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more fickle. At the same time, though, Toinet is certainly correct both to 
emphasise the limits to the current expressions of French ‘malaise’ and to 
place it in its appropriate historical context (Toinet, 1996). The system is 
not yet ungovernable and the past is not always a better place. Indeed, the 
high level of public support for the Jospin government in its first year 
suggested that political leaders who confront the new terms of the debate 
and provide appropriate responses can still engage in successful statecraft. 
In this context, the competition between the president and the prime 
minister is still an essential element of French politics. The relationship 
between the two components of the twin-headed executive is still a 
defining feature of France’s semi-presidential system. 
 
